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Abstract—While the security of cloud remains a concern, a
common practice is to encrypt data before outsourcing them for
utilization. One key challenging issue is how to efficiently perform
queries over the ciphertext. Conventional crypto-based solu-
tions, e.g. partially/fully homomorphic encryption and searchable
encryption, suffer from low performance, poor expressiveness
and weak compatibility. An alternative method that utilizes
hardware-assisted trusted execution environment, i.e., Intel SGX,
has emerged recently. On one hand, such work lacks of sup-
porting scalable access control over multiple data users. On
the other hand, existing solutions are subjected to the key
revocation problem and knowledge extractor vulnerability. In
this work, we leverage the newly hardware-assisted methodology
and propose a secure, scalable and efficient SQL-like query
framework named QShield. Building upon Intel SGX, QShield
can guarantee the confidentiality and integrity of sensitive data
when being processed on an untrusted cloud platform. More-
over, we present a novel lightweight secret sharing method to
enable multi-user access control in QShield, while tackling the
key revocation problem. Furthermore, with an additional trust
proof mechanism, QShield guarantees the correctness of queries
and significantly alleviates the possibility to build knowledge
extractor. We implemented a prototype for QShield and show
that QShield incurs minimum performance cost.
Index Terms—outsourcing data, secure query, cloud comput-
ing, enclave, trusted execution environment (TEE)
I. INTRODUCTION
The cloud computing paradigm, characterized by conve-
nience, elasticity and low-cost, demonstrates a great success
in the past decade [1]. Organizations typically need to deploy
their application services (ASes) to remote servers that are
not in charge by themselves, which leaves these organizations
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no choice but to trust the cloud in outsourcing their data
for utilization. This security assumption that the cloud is
fully trusted, however, is not always valid, especially when
outsourced data contain sensitive information such as medical
records and personal identifiable information, since the cloud
may suffer from the malfunctions or even compromise of the
AS as well as system software, e.g. OS and VM hypervisor.
Hence, many cloud-based systems depend on cryptography to
protect confidential data when being transmitted, computed
and/or stored. One of biggest challenges is how to efficiently
compute over encrypted data while not hindering data utiliza-
tion, such as queries that are performed frequently in many
systems [2]–[5]. Typically, a generic query can be denoted by
a SQL-like expression and interpreted as a query plan, i.e.
directed acyclic graph (DAG) of computational operators for
execution, such as projection, selection, aggregation, union
and join.
Partially/Fully homomorphic encryption (PHE/FHE) [6],
[7] is a fundamental technology to solve the problem in
the literature. However, such pure crypto-based solutions at
present suffer from severe expressiveness and performance
issues [8]–[10]. For example, FHE introduces many orders of
magnitude overheads and cannot handle computational tasks
of a practical scale. Searchable Encryption (SE) enables search
over encrypted data. Albeit there exist extensive investigations
along this research line, current SE implementation is still
not satisfactory [11]. Notably, building upon various crypto
primitives, different SE schemes support different search types,
e.g., single keyword, multi-keywords and range, with different
index structures, and are not compatible with each other. Be-
sides, SE focuses on conditional information retrieval, which
can only be viewed as a selection operator. As such, existing
schemes inherently cannot be applied or extended to support
generic (full-featured) queries.
Recognizing the possible hardware-assisted trusted execu-
tion environment (TEE), i.e., Intel SGX, is used in [11]–
[13] as an alternative promising countermeasure, but presents
several limitations. Specifically, Hardidx in [12] only considers
a single data user scenario; it does not support access control
over multiple data users, which is a fundamental functionality
for utilization of data outsourced to the cloud. Rearguard in
[11] improved that but has scalability problem, since it requires
each authorized data user to perform cumbersome remote
attestation for authentication and verification. In contrast with
the two systems who focus on information retrieval, Opaque
[13] adopts a generic SQL-like query model. Its primary goal,
however, also does not take multi-user access control into
account. Moreover, the above works overlook the fact that
a TEE can still be influenced by an untrusted host AS -
even though the integrity and correctness of a TEE can be
attested, the expected invocation of TEE interfaces cannot
be guaranteed - this will potentially cause some covert, non-
trivial security and privacy issues, especially after the entrusted
key materials are delivered to a TEE. For instance, the key
revocation problem, firstly identified by [14], means that an
untrusted host AS may selectively drop network packets such
that it is problematic for a valid remote entity to timely and
effectively revoke crypto keys within a TEE. Another example
is knowledge extractor [15], which indicates that the global
internal state of a TEE can be influenced by an untrusted
host AS by not following the expected protocol workflow
and thus open door for exposing confidential information.
Please refer to [16], [17] for concrete real world cases.
Furthermore, a practical design for a SGX-based query system
is implementing each computational operator as a unique TEE
interface. This incurs another challenging issue, that is, how
to guarantee the integrity of the whole distributed workflow
per query [18].
In this paper, we propose a secure, scalable and efficient
query framework called QShield to enable flexible utilization
of outsourced data; it adopts Intel SGX to establish hardware-
assisted TEEs (also called enclaves) in the untrusted cloud
platform to protect the confidentiality and integrity of sensitive
data run inside. By considering a more generic SQL-like query
model, QShield is capable of handling majority of common
computational tasks. Notably, we define four operators in
QShield, i.e., projection, selection, aggregation, join, and
each of them is implemented as a unique enclave functional
interface. We remark that an enclave theoretically can realize
arbitrary computational operators. In addition, we exploit
the widely-adopted, flexible document-oriented data model in
QShield to enable compatibility since cloud applications in
web, mobile, social or IoT scenarios often use different data
models, such as relational tables, key-value items and data
streams [19], [20].
With regard to supporting access control over multiple data
users, a straightforward method, adopted by previous work, is
as follows: Let the data owner securely provision the crypto
key and his/her access policy to the enclave through remote
attestation; Then, the enclave loads encrypted data, recovers
authorized data for a specific user, and queries over them.
Such a method, however, exposes fatal flaws since only TEEs
in the cloud are trustworthy. First, it is a risky thing to
hand out the crypto key to an enclave in the long run; as
mentioned above, a compromised host AS can either make use
of the enclave performing malicious computation or extract
the crypto key from it. Albeit Chen et al. in [14] proposed
a novel ”heartbeat” synchronization protocol to enable key
revocation on demand, their work is vulnerable to network
failure and requires a trusted broker to be always online
[21]. Second, each authorized data user still needs to perform
remote attestation to verify the integrity and correctness of the
enclave, which is a cumbersome process and thus causes poor
scalability. In order to tackle these issues, we present a novel,
lightweight secret sharing method. The core idea is let the
data owner assign an attested enclave a secret share ska and
each authorized data user another unique secret share skib. The
crypto key sk can be reconstructed and used for decryption
if and only if the skib is delivered to the enclave that holds
ska per query. Once the authorized data are recovered, the
crypto key sk is erased. As such, neither data users nor the
enclave have full capability to recover the encrypted data with
their own secret shares outside the scope of current query;
the non-trivial key revocation problem can then be avoided.
Another beneficial gain is that the enclave and a data user can
effectively authenticate with each other through their unique
secret shares rather than cumbersome remote attestation.
Nevertheless, due to the fact that Intel SGX provides no
functionality to dynamically attest distributed computational
workflow, we need a mechanism to enforce that the recovered
data within enclave are only used to serve the current query.
Otherwise, a compromised host AS may execute arbitrary
enclave operators other than desired ones, generating incorrect
results; Worse still, it may build knowledge extractor to expose
sensitive information. In QShield, we propose a two-part
solution to solve this problem. First, we leverage an endurance
indicator denoted by ω to restrict the times that the recovered
data as well as its derived intermediate results can be computed
by enclave operators. Second, we view the query process as a
finite state machine (FSM) and make the enclave record and
output execution footprints of state transition as a workflow
proof for auditing.
Our key contributions are summarized as follows. 1) Build-
ing upon the off-the-shelf hardware-assisted TEE, i.e., Intel
SGX, we propose a practical secure query framework named
QShield for outsourcing data in the untrusted cloud. Compared
to existing crypto-based solutions, the proposed framework is
efficient and powerful. 2) By supporting common SQL-like
query expressions and flexible document-oriented data model,
QShield can be easily adopted by most of cloud-based query
application scenarios. 3) Under threats caused by the limitation
of SGX architecture, we present a secure, lightweight secret
sharing method to make QShield capable of realizing scalable
multi-user access control. 4) We also propose a trust proof
mechanism to ensure correctness of queries as expectation
with auditing and meanwhile greatly alleviating the possibility
to build knowledge extractor.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Intel SGX
Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) is a promising
hardware-assisted trusted computing technology. It provides
memory isolation [22], which enables a host application set
up a protected execution environment, called enclave, such
that code and data run inside are resilient to attacks from
privilege software, including OS kernel and VM hypervisor.
Function calls between the untrusted host application and
enclave are through well-designed ECALL/OCALL interfaces.
Specifically, a call to enclave is referred to as an ECALL
and OCALL allows enclave codes to call untrusted functions
outside. Such an architecture implies that the invocation to
ECALLs is unreliable since it is still under control of the
untrusted host application. Intel SGX also offers two auxiliary
functionalities: remote attestation and storage sealing [23].
The former makes a distant entity capable of verifying the
authenticity of an enclave, checking the integrity of desired
code running inside and meanwhile establishing a secure com-
munication channel with the enclave. The latter allows to store
enclave data in untrusted storage outside for future recovery, in
case of server shutdown, system failure, and/or power outage.
Please refer to [24] for a more thorough technical analysis
about Intel SGX.
Limitations. Intel SGX, however, is reported to suffer from
various vulnerabilities caused by either physical or digital
attacks. Among which, one mainstream methodology is ex-
ploiting side-channels, including cache timing, power anal-
ysis, branch shadowing, and the most recently discovered
foreshadow transient execution, etc. to expose confidential
information [9], [16], [25], [26]. Moreover, the fore-mentioned
implication with regard to ECALL invocation can incur poten-
tial security threats, for example, the key revocation problem
[14]. Besides the listed side-channels, it is also found that
utilizing ECALL invocation can build knowledge extractor
[27]. Furthermore, a malicious OS can launch DoS attack to
disrupt operations of enclave functions due to the fact that it
is still in charge of the underlying enclave resource allocation.
B. Bilinear Maps
We briefly review a few facts about groups with efficiently
computable bilinear maps [28], based on which we implement
the proposed secret sharing mechanism in QShield.
Let G1 and G2 be two multiplicative cyclic groups of prime
order p, and g be a generator of G1. An efficiently computable
bilinear map e : G1 ×G1 → G2 defined over the two groups
satisfies the following properties:
1) Bilinearity: for all a, b ∈ Zp, there exists e(g
a, gb) =
e(g, g)ab
2) Non-degeneracy: e(g, g) 6= 1
3) Computability: for any u, v ∈ G1, there exists an efficient
algorithm to compute e(u, v).
Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Assumption. The se-
curity of our secret sharing mechanism is based on the
Decisional BDH assumption. Basically, let a, b, c, z be chosen
randomly from Zp, there exists no probabilistic polynomial-
time algorithm B that can distinguish the tuple (A = ga, B =
gb, C = gc, e(g, g)abc) from the tuple (A = ga, B = gb, C =
gc, e(g, g)z) with more than a negligible advantage ǫ, that is,
|Pr[B(A,B,C,e(g, g)abc) = 0]
− Pr[B(A,B,C, e(g, g)z) = 0]| ≤ ǫ,
...
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Fig. 1. System Model
where the probability is computed over the randomly chosen
generator g, the randomly chosen a, b, c, z in Zp, and the
random bits consumed by B.
III. MODELS AND ASSUMPTIONS
A. System Model
As illustrated in Fig. 1, QShield involves one data owner
and multiple data users. The data owner uses a block cipher
encryption algorithm such as AES[GCM] making use of a
symmetric key sk to protect his/her sensitive data outsourced
to the cloud. He/She also defines access permissions for each
data user in the system. Upon receiving a query request from
an authorized data user, the enclaved cloud AS can retrieve
those ciphertexts and compute over them for response.
More concretely, the AS first creates a dedicated enclave
for the data owner. Provided that it is successfully attested,
the data owner can establish a secure communication channel
with the enclave, through which a secret share ska of sk and
an access policy pol towards involved data users are delivered.
Meanwhile, the data owner assigns each authorized data user
the other unique secret share skib of sk. Here, we assume
that the communication process between the data owner and
data users is secure and happens out-of-band. Given skib, a
data user now is capable of building valid query requests
to the AS. In QShield, a request is defined to include a
SQL-like query expression and a cryptographically protected
token. On the cloud side, upon receiving a query request,
the AS first forwards the token to the enclave, enabling
the enclave itself create an initial state for the query, and
meanwhile transforms the query expression into a query plan.
Then, the AS invokes corresponding operators for computation
accordingly. As the whole computation per query globally runs
to completion, the enclave will go through several intermediate
states and reach to a final state, i.e., results. In parallel with
this state transition process, the enclave records footprints of
execution to establish a trust proof for the query. At last, the
enclave cryptographically encapsulates the results and returns
the ciphertext along with a self-signed trust proof to the AS
for query response.
B. Data Model
We opt for a document-oriented data model in QShield
due to its flexibility in being compatible with most types
of data models, e.g., relational tables, key-value items and
data streams, exploited by current web, mobile, social, as
well as IoT applications. Specifically, QShield employs the
notion of document D as a basic logical unit for data stor-
age and query, which, encoded in JSON, contains a set of
attributes {A1, · · · , An|Aj := < namej, valuej >, j =
1, · · · , n}, where namej is a description of the attribute
Aj and valuej is a value for that attribute. It also uses the
notion of collection C to represent a group of documents,
each of which includes a same set of attribute descriptions.
When outsourced to the cloud, a collection of size r can
be divided into multiple parts, each stored as a data file
F of size s. Formally, C = {F1, · · · , Fm−1, Fm|Fk =
{D(k−1)∗s+1, D(k−1)∗s+2, · · · , D(k−1)∗s+s}, k = 1, · · · ,m−
1;Fm = {D(m−1)∗s+1, · · · , D(m−1)∗s+(r%s)}}.
What follows is the formal definition of four computational
operators supported by QShield.
Projection operator (π): It traverses a collection C and
iteratively prunes unselected attributes (/∈ {Ap, · · · , Aq})
from each involved document. Algebraically, C′ ←
π(Ap, · · · , Aq)(C).
Selection operator (σ): It bases a predicate P over attributes,
e.g., C.Aj = b, to filter out the documents not satisfying P .
Algebraically, C′ ← σ(P )(C).
Aggregation operator (φ): It applies aggregate functions f ,
e.g. average, over an attribute Aj of documents in a collection
C. Algebraically, value← φ(f,Aj)(C)
Join operator (γ): It bases a predicate P , e.g., C1.Ap =
C2.Aq , to perform natural join over two collections C1 and
C2. Algebraically, C
′ ← γ(P )(C1, C2).
C. Threat Model
The main goal of QShield is exploiting Intel SGX to build a
system that can efficiently and correctly answer queries over
outsourced data in multi-user settings while offering strong
privacy guarantee to the data owner. We assume that the
queries themselves (expressions) are not sensitive - only their
answers and input datasets are - and that data users will
honestly execute protocol but also desire to query data beyond
their own permissions (honest-but-curious). Note that, QShield
consists of multiple enclave functional interfaces; once they
are loaded in the cloud platform, the data owner is capable of
attesting their integrity and correctness.
Besides the standard SGX threat model where an attacker
may control the cloud’s software stack, including hypervisor
and OS, we consider a more powerful attacker who may
also compromise the AS that hosts the enclave. As such,
1) the attacker may prevent the data owner from revoking
the previously entrusted crypto key on demand by selectively
dropping network packets; 2) the attacker may trigger black-
swan level information leakage, once she (painstakingly but
potentially) builds knowledge extractor to recover the long-
term crypto key within the enclave; 3) the attacker may
arbitrarily invoke enclave functional interfaces, resulting in
incorrect results and contributing to knowledge extractor;
Denial-of-service, enclave bugs and interface interruption,
physically measuring and manipulating SGX-enabled CPU
package, and collusion between data users with the cloud are
outside our scope for now.
IV. QSHIELD CONSTRUCTION
A. Countermeasures
We introduce two novel methods to make QShield against
attacks highlighted in Section III-C, so as to accomplish its
promising design goals.
a) Secret Sharing: We remark that the fact a long-term
crypto key is handed out to an enclave significantly contributes
to those attacks. First, such a full-capability (in terms of
ciphertext decryption) enclave may be maliciously used by
the host AS. Second, the enclave may not be as impregnable
as a wall of iron in a long run; the crypto key can be exposed.
Third, the entrusted crypto key may fail to be revoked as the
data owner desires. This seems a dilemma for the data owner,
since he/she needs to entrust the crypto key to the enclave
for data utilization. We propose a novel idea to solve this. In
a nutshell, we partition the full decryption capability among
involved participants, i.e., the enclave and data users, and it can
be restored only when the enclave handles queries issued by a
data user. On one hand, neither the enclave nor the data user
has the full capability to recover ciphertexts outside the scope
of a query. Risks regarding to exposure of a long-term enclave
crypto key are also eliminated. On the other hand, it inherently
supports authentication between the enclave and data users,
thus avoiding cumbersome remote attestation between them.
In our context, such secret sharing scheme can be defined
over a tree-based access structure. Specifically, the root node
of the access tree is an AND gate: its left child represents
the enclave; its right child is an OR gate with n children,
each representing a data user. We note that this construction
has been widely used in cryptography, like attribute-based
encryption. Similarly, we base bilinear maps design a crypto
primitive called E to facilitate secret sharing in QShield, which
consists of following algorithms:
• sk, ska, {sk1b , sk
2
b , · · · , sk
n
b } ← setup(1
λ, n): This algo-
rithm takes as inputs a security parameter λ and a non-zero
positive integer n. It outputs following secret components: a
symmetric secret key sk, a secret share ska, and n secret
shares skib (1 ≤ i ≤ n). More specifically, it first defines
a bilinear group G1 of prime order p with a generator g
and a bilinear map e : G1 × G1 → G2 that has properties
of bilinearity, non-degeneracy and computability. Then, it
randomly picks up two numbers r and m from Zp and for
each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, it uniformly chooses a number ti at random
from Zp. At last, it computes sk = H(e(g, g)
m), ska =
{gt1 , · · · , gtn , e(g, g)(r+m)}, skib = g
2r+m
ti (1 ≤ i ≤ n).
• ct ← encrypt(sk,msg): This algorithm takes in the sym-
metric secret key sk and a message msg. It then encrypts the
data using symmetric encryption, i.e., ct← E.Enc(sk,msg)
and finally outputs the corresponding ciphertext ct.
• msgi ← decrypt(pol, ska, skib, ct): This algorithm takes as
inputs an access policy pol, the secret share ska, the secret
share skib, and the ciphertext ct. It outputs the corresponding
data msgi that can be accessed by the one who owns skib.
More specifically, the algorithm first looks up the ska to
retrieve e(g, g)(r+m) and gti , and computes e(gti , skib) =
e(gti , g
2r+m
ti ) = e(g, g)(2r+m). Then, it reconstructs the
secret key sk by computing (e(g,g)
(r+m))2
e(g,g)(2r+m)
= e(g, g)m and
performing H(e(g, g)m). Finally, it decrypts the cyphertext
ct with sk, i.e., pt ← E.Dec(sk, ct) and obtains msgi by
filtering out those unauthorized data in pt according to the
access policy pol. By design, this algorithm is executed by
an enclave interface, thus the confidentiality of data and the
unique workflow of this algorithm can be enforced.
b) Trust Proof: Albeit the novel secret sharing idea
blocks out most of mentioned attacks, it is still possible for a
compromised host AS to maliciously call enclave operators
for computation over the recovered native message msgi.
Obviously, this can incur incorrect results. There also exists
a covert threat, i.e., building knowledge extractor to expose
sensitive information. For example, computation over msgi
under different invocation sequences often leads to different
results. An attacker may utilize such difference along with
prior knowledge to discover sensitive information. In order to
alleviate these risks, on one hand, we leverage an endurance
indicator denoted by ω to restrict the times that msgi and
its derived intermediate messages can be accessed by enclave
operators; on the other hand, we record the execution trace of
each enclave operator per query and chain them together as a
trust proof. By design, once the final result is obtained, the ω
will be set as 0, such that no access over relevant messages
are allowed any more. Suppose that the compromised host AS
invokes some (even one) enclave operator(s) outside the scope
of current query, it will not be able to construct a valid trust
proof for auditing, since there is no enough ω allowing to
do that. Such a countermeasure also greatly reduces training
datasets for knowledge extractor construction.
B. Framework Description
Next, we present a description of QShield protocols, which
include System Setup, Data Upload, Data Query, and Policy
Update. Note that, E represents a 256-bits authenticated sym-
metric key encryption scheme, which consists of Enc(·) and
Dec(·) algorithms. PKE represents a 256-bits indistinguisha-
bility security under chosen plaintext attack (IND-CPA) public
key encryption scheme, which consists of KeyGen(·), Enc(·)
and Dec(·) algorithms. S stands for a 256-bits existentially
unforgeable signature scheme, which consists of KeyGen(·),
Sign(·) and V erify(·) algorithms. H(·) denotes a 256-bits
collision resistant hash function. f∗ stands for enclave com-
putational operators ∗, where ∗ can be a projector π, a selector
σ, an aggregator φ, or a joiner γ.
System Setup The data owner first selects a security param-
eter λ and defines the scale of data users n, i.e., the maximum
number of data users allowed in the system. Then, he/she
invokes E .setup(1λ, n) to generate all secret components sk,
ska, {sk
1
b , sk
2
b , · · · , sk
n
b }. Besides, the data owner creates an
access policy pol := < (uid, cids)j >
n−1
j=0 , where the uid and
cids of an entry j represents the ID of a data user and all IDs
(initialized as NULL) of collections authorized to the data user,
respectively. On the cloud side, the AS creates a dedicated
enclave EApp for the data owner. It subsequently performs
an ECALL to let the enclave generate a 256-bits public
key pair, i.e., (pke,msg , ske,msg)← PKE.KeyGen(1
λ), and
a 256-bits signature key pair, i.e., (vke,sign , ske,sign) ←
S.KeyGen(1λ). The pke,msg and vke,sign are output as public
system parameters. Next, the data owner verifies that the EApp
is correctly deployed and executed on a genuine Intel SGX-
enabled CPU platform through remote attestation. During this
process, he/she also establishes a secure communication chan-
nel with EApp by negotiating a symmetric secret key skcomm.
After that, the data owner makes use of skcomm to escort the
secret share ska to EApp, i.e., ctska ← E.Enc(skcomm, ska)
by the data owner and ska ← E.Dec(skcomm, ctska) by the
enclave. For each data user i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) registered in the
system, the data owner selects a unique secret share skib and
securely delivers it to the specific data user.
Data Upload When a new document msg is ready for
outsourcing, the data owner obtains its ciphertext ctmsg by
executing E .encrypt(sk,msg) and performs H(ctmsg) to
create a unique ID did for the document. Provided that the
document belongs to an existing collection, the data owner
just uploads {did, ctmsg} to the cloud and inserts it to the
collection. Otherwise, the data owner needs to create a new
collection with ID cid in the cloud, defines access permissions
over the collection for data users, and iteratively updates each
authorized data user’s collection ID list cids in the policy
pol with cid. The updated pol will then trigger the execution
of Policy Update protocol described below. At last, the data
owner uploads {did, ctmsg} to the newly generated collection
in the cloud.
Remarks: the exploited one document per upload paradigm
can benefit a real-time cloud application. Beyond that, the data
owner can improve network throughput by buffering a certain
amount of documents before performing an upload action.
Data Query In this protocol, an authorized data user i
requests queries towards the collections shared by the data
owner. A query req by design consists of two parts: a SQL-
like expression q and a unique query token tk, which is
generated by encrypting the data user’s secret share skib,
an endurance indicator ω, and a monotonically increasing
positive number c with the enclave’s public key pke,msg ,
i.e, tk ← PKE.Enc(pke,msg, (sk
i
b, ω, c)). Note that, ω is
calculated based on the current query expression.
Upon the AS receives a query request req from the data
user, it will perform the following two steps. The first one,
Query
Expression
Query
Plan
SUM(C1 [A4])  From  C1 [A1, A3, A5],  C2 [A2, A3, A4]
Where C1 [A3]  =  C2 [A3] and C1 [A1]  > a
f
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Fig. 2. A Running Example for Query Transformation
called unlock, enables the enclave EApp to recover the collec-
tions allowed to be accessed by the data user. Specifically,
the AS first retrieves relevant encrypted collections ct and
forwards them along with the token tk to EApp, within which
the enclave executes PKE.Dec(ske,msg, tk) → {sk
i
b, c, ω}.
Then, EApp checks whether or not the current request has been
previously handled by comparing c with a c′ (initialized as
−1). If c is smaller than c′, the enclave will deny to serve the
current request; otherwise, it updates c′ with c and further calls
E .decrypt(pol, ska, sk
i
b, ct) to recover authorized collections
msgi.
The other step is called query, which invokes enclave com-
putational operators to perform computation over the msgi
and delivers a response res to the data user. In this step,
the AS first retrieves query expression q from the request
req and transforms it into a query plan τ , which by design
is representable by a directed acyclic graph (DAG). To be
specific, vertices in the DAG are de facto well-designed
enclave computational operators, i.e. fpi, fσ , fφ, fγ , and
directed edges illustrate the data flow between them. Figure 2
shows a running example where the data user issues a query
over two collections C1[A1, A3, A5] and C2[A2, A3, A4]. The
query first filters out from C1 the documents that the value of
A1 is less equal than a. Then, it performs projection of C1
and C2 on A3 and [A3, A4], respectively, and further joins the
two collections under C1[A3] = C2[A3]. At the end, the query
computes the sum of C2[A4].
Afterwards, the AS begins to schedule corresponding en-
clave operators f∗ in accordance with the query plan τ .
As this process proceeds, the enclave EApp will go through
several states S0, S1, · · · , Sk. Here, a state is defined as a
struct that includes s id, p states, func, s db and w, where
s id is the state ID; p states records all IDs of previous
states that derives S under the function of f∗; func records
metadata of f∗, which includes its name f name and its
parameters f params; s db stores the real workload of state
data; w records the maximum times that the current state can
be accessed by enclave operators; Notably, S0 is initialized
with the recovered native message msgi and the endurance
indicator ω in the token. Figure 3 demonstrates the pseudo-
code of f∗.
After the enclave reaches to the final state Sk, it can
construct a response for the current query. More concretely,
the response includes two parts: result and trust proof. The
result is generated by encrypting the data field s db in
Pseudo-code of  f* : Input( params ); Static( states )
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
Analyze state dependency   sd,  predicate  p, input   collections c 
of  f* from  params
for each state id  s in  sd do
Check whether or not there exists     states.s_id equals to  s
if not exists in   states then
Return parameter error and exit
Create a new state   s_new with  s_id
for each state in states do
Check whether or not state.   w is larger than 0
if not then
Return state error and exit
12
13 Update s_new.p_states, s_new.func[ f_name ], 
s_new.func[ f_params ] with  sd, __NAME__( f* ), 
{ p, sd }, respectively
Retrieve data fields of collections      c from  states, perform 
functional computation based on     p over them, and write the 
result to  s_new.s_db
14
15
for each state in states do
Update state.w with  state.w -1
16 Update s_new.w with the newly endurance value in     states and 
add s_new into  states
17 Exit
Generate a unique random number as state id     s_id
Fig. 3. Pseudo-code of the Enclave Computational Operator f∗
Sk with the data user’s secret share sk
i
b, formally, result
← E.Enc(skib, Sk.s db), and the trust proof is a tuple
(tp, σtp), where tp is execution trace obtained from all states
S0, S1, · · · , Sk and σtp is a signature signed by the enclave,
i.e., σtp ← S.Sign(ske,sign, tp). When the data user gets
the response, he/she can recover the result by computing
E.Dec(skib, result) and audit it with the trust proof tp.
Policy Update This protocol handles all events of policy
update, i.e., user add/remove and access permission modifi-
cation. When a new data user j (1 ≤ j ≤ n) joins in the
system, the data owner first selects a unique secret share skjb
and securely sends it to the data user. Then, he/she defines
a set of collections that can be accessed by the data user
and computes a unique ID uid for the data user by hashing
skjb , i.e., uid ← H(sk
j
b). At last, the data owner updates the
policy pol in EApp with a new item (uid, cids) through their
previously established secure channel. As for the remaining
two circumstances, the data owner only needs to either delete
or alter the corresponding item in the pol for the specific user.
Remarks: one potential issue here is that the update com-
mands may not be received by an enclave. This can be
solved by just requiring a response for each update from the
enclave. Supposing it is caused by network failure, the data
owner can continue to send the update command until he/she
receives a response. Provided that the host AS is compromised,
the potential corresponding damage is limited and affordable
before the data owner takes some remedial measures, since
the secret sharing mechanism guarantees that the enclave has
no full capability to decrypt ciphertexts.
C. Distributed Mode
With data becoming available in larger quantities and system
requiring higher throughputs, a common practice for the AS is
exploiting distributed computation, where tasks are processed
across multiple computational nodes in the cloud. We remark
that QShield can be extended so as to support such context.
To this end, we introduce the notions of broker and worker in
QShield: a broker is a dedicated enclave created for the data
owner; a worker is a general enclave serving all data users,
which implements one of computational operators fpi, fσ , fφ,
fγ . As illustrated in Fig. 2, we have E1(N1), E2(N2), E3(N2),
E4(N3), E5(N1), where Ex(Ny) represents the x
th worker in
the yth node. Compared with the stand-alone mode, protocols
in QShield have following changes.
Other than the query step in Data Query protocol, interac-
tions with the enclave in all original protocols are replaced by
with the broker. We also modify the following two protocols
accordingly.
System Setup: On behalf of the data owner, the broker
validates the intactness of codes of workers and the credibility
of their hosting SGX-enabled platforms through remote attes-
tation, and meanwhile builds interconnected secure channels
with all workers by negotiating a common communication key.
Data Query: In the query step, after the broker obtains msgi
and ω, it creates an initial state S0 with the two items for
the current query. Then, based on the query plan τ , the
AS successively schedules workers instead for computation.
Notably, when a worker finishes its computational task, it
generates a new state Sj (j = 1, · · · , k) and informs the
broker to record its execution trace. Besides, the last worker
will forward the final state, i.e., results, to the broker for
response construction. All communications between the broker
and workers during above process are through the previously
established secure channels.
V. IMPLEMENTATION
We implemented a prototype for QShield in C using the
Intel SGX SDK (v2.4) for linux. It is tested on a SGX-enabled
platform that runs an Intel Kaby Lake i7-7700 processor at
3.60GHz with 16 GiB of RAM and Ubuntu 16.04 operating
system. The code is compiled using gcc in the debug mode.
Library Migration. In order to offer strong security guaran-
tees, Intel SGX sets two restrictions on enclave development:
1) an enclave only supports portion of legal CPU instructions;
and 2) libraries used by an enclave must be statically linked.
Therefore, we have to port the adopted third-party libraries
for use in the SGX development environment. By analysis, we
need migrate the Stanford pairing-based cryptography (PBC)
library and its dependency GNU multiple precision (GMP)
library into the prototype. The lucky thing is that Intel already
demonstrates how to transform GMP into an enclave-safe
trusted library. Following the same procedure, we can do PBC
migration. However, the native PBC library does not decouple
I/Oes from its core functionality, so we need to rewrite the
affected functions.
The native PBC library relies on a fundamental data struct
called field s, which defines three I/O function pointers,
i.e., out str, snprint and out info. These interfaces out-
put elements of a field in a human-readable manner and
have different instances when the field is initialized using
different algorithms. While operating on a non-enclave-safe C
File* type, their native implementations are at odds with the
SGX development environment. On the other hand, OCALL
functions are typically implemented by an untrusted host
AS; it is weird to assemble OCALLs into an enclave-safe
library. As such, we work out a method for an enclave to
collect messages from its linked libraries, built upon which
the three I/O interfaces in the PBC library are re-implemented
to facilitate the output of human-readable information. In a
nutshell, the enclave-safe library first caches output messages
in its global memory stack and then makes it accessible
through public interfaces. To be specific, we implement
three auxiliary interfaces in the ported PBC library, i.e.,
sgx init msg(·), sgx clear msg(·), and sgx get msg(·),
where sgx init msg(·) initializes a global memory region
for recording output message while sgx clear msg(·) frees
the memory region. sgx get msg(·), used between the two
interfaces, is capable of reading the memory region.
VI. EVALUATION
A. Correctness and Security
Correctness. QShield is correct, if for the data owner and
all authorized data users in the system, the following three
statements hold: 1) the probability that a query issued by a data
user can compute over unauthorized data is negligible; 2) the
probability that other involved entities including the cloud
platform and host AS can obtain sensitive data is negligible;
3) the probability that a data user accepts an incorrect result
is negligible.
Built upon the presented secret sharing and trust proof
mechanisms, such correctness is realized by follows. A valid
query by design brings a unique cryptographical token, which
can only be utilized by the enclave that holds secret share ska.
Once obtaining skib, the enclave can recover data from loaded
ciphertexts by calling E .decrypt(·). During this process, the
enclave also enforces access control policy on behalf of the
data owner, eliminating unauthorized data accesses. Thanks
to the security properties of SGX, the cloud platform and
host AS cannot spy on the recovered data. Besides, should
a compromised host AS arbitrarily invokes enclave operators,
the incorrect result will be detected by the end user through
its associated trust proof.
Security. Next, we discuss the security properties achieved
by QShield.
a) Confidentiality of crypto key and outsourced data:
This property is guaranteed by both the adopted enclave
interfaces and the E scheme.
At System Setup, the data owner generates all secret
components sk, ska, sk
i
b(i = 1, · · · , n) (by E .keygen(·))
and establishes a secure communication channel with the
enclave through remote attestation, under which the ska is
escorted to the enclave. The data owner also assigns skib to
each authorized data user securely. At Data Upload, the data
owner encrypts his/her data with sk (by E .encrypt(·)) and
outsources the ciphertexts ct to the cloud for utilization. At
the moment, even the enclave and data users both have secret
shares, no one can decrypt the ciphertexts. At Data Query,
a valid query request brings the crypto-protected skib to the
enclave that holds ska for sk reconstruction. Once the enclave
recovers authorized data msgi, the crypto key sk will be
erased (by E .decrypt(·)). The subsequent computations over
msgi are performed by enclave operators and the final results
are encrypted before delivering to the user. Due to the fact
that the integrity and correctness of enclave interfaces are
guaranteed by SGX, the confidentiality of crypto key and
outsourced data are realized as long as the E scheme is secure.
The E scheme in essentials consists of two independent
crypto components: secret sharing scheme EA, which generates
a symmetric key sk and its shares ska, sk
i
b; and symmetric
key encryption scheme EB , which encrypts and decrypts
data with sk. In QShield, EB is IND-CPA secure since we
adopt an authenticated symmetric encryption scheme, e.g.,
AES[GCM]. Therefore, E is secure if and only if sk can be
securely reconstructed by authorized parties and the IND-CPA
security of data encrypted with sk cannot be compromised.
As described above, the security of ska transmission and
sk reconstruction is ensured by SGX, so we just need to
prove that data users possessing skib cannot recover sk without
the knowledge of ska, even if they are colluded, and vice
versa. We recall that our secret sharing scheme makes use
of widely-adopted bilinear maps implementing a tree-based
access structure. It has been proven secure under the standard
bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) assumption in many crypto
works [29], [30]. Therefore, without ska, any combination
of skib cannot constitute a valid authorized set for the access
structure, and vice versa, and thus the blind factor of the root
node for sk cannot be recovered unless the BDH assumption
is compromised.
b) Trustworthy query processing: This property is guar-
anteed by both the remote attestation of SGX and the trust
proof mechanism. During remote attestation, the enclave will
generate a cryptographic tag called quote for the program
running inside the enclave, with which the data owner can ver-
ify the integrity and correctness of critical enclave interfaces
that take sensitive data as input, i.e., fpi, fσ, fφ, fγ . With
regard to the correctness of distributed workflow per query,
the constructed trust proof guarantees that the host AS cannot
arbitrarily invoke enclave operators for computation.
c) Scalable multi-user access control: QShield exploits a
straightforward access control list (ACL) to realize authoriza-
tion to data users. Each data user is only associated with an
item (uid, cids) in the policy pol. When a data user queries
over the outsourced data, the enclave on behalf of the data
owner will check the pol and decide whether or not the
current query is valid. When the policy needs to be updated,
it only requires to modify corresponding items in pol. With
regard to authentication, the data owner in QShield assigns
each data user a secret share skib and an enclave the other
secret share ska. While pairing the two shares for crypto
key reconstruction, the enclave and the data user can also
authenticate with each other. As the above process produces
much less temporal and spatial overhead, QShield achieves
scalable access control over multiple users.
B. Performance
We evaluate QShield in terms of computational overhead
of two core components, that is, enclave operators and the E
scheme.
a) Enclave operators: Figure 4 (a) - (d) illustrates the
performance of implemented enclave operators fpi, fσ , fφ, and
fγ , respectively (without optimization). It can be observed that
these operators are very efficient with millisecond (ms) order
of magnitude. However, the performance degradation of fγ
is more fierce than the other three ones as the number of
documents grows. This is because the join operation needs
nested iterations through two whole collections to search all
solutions.
The experimental results also demonstrate that our method
exploiting hardware-assist TEE shows great competitiveness to
the pure crypto solutions like partially/fully homomorphic en-
cryption (FHE/PHE). In a recent work by Ding. et al. [6], they
implemented several low-level computational operators based
on Paillier’s PHE, e.g., addition/subtraction, multiplication,
absolute, comparison and equality test. Their experimental
analysis shows that a single comparison operation requires 8
module exponentiation and the corresponding execution time
on a PC with similar configuration than ours is about 50ms
under a weak security level (i.e., the security parameter n is
set as 1024 bits). When considering a stronger security level
(e.g., n = 2048 bits), it will reach to approximate 375ms. The
execution time for a single string comparison operation in our
method, however, is much smaller (µs order of magnitude).
Due to the fact that each of the four enclave operators consists
of numerous string comparisons, it is unrealistic to implement
them using PHE.
b) E scheme: This crypto primitive is executed by both
the data owner and the enclave in QShield. We focus on
analyzing the performance of E .decrypt(·) with Intel SGX, in
that E .keygen(·) is an one-time constant operation at system
initialization, and E .encrypt(·) just computes a straightfor-
ward AES ciphertext.
In our setting, an enclave executes E .decrypt(·) with dif-
ferent input sizes, ranging from 1 Byte to 100K Bytes.
This simulates the real world where data to be processed
varies greatly. For example, a batch-based query needs to
perform computation over historical data with thousands of
documents, while a real-time-based query requires to com-
pute over few documents (even one) every time to satisfy
timeliness. Figure 4 (e) shows the performance of decryption
of implemented E scheme (without optimization). We use a
native AES decryption realized by Intel SGX as baseline,
which, by comparison, lacks of crypto key reconstruction. It
can be concluded: 1) the decryption performance of E scheme
TABLE I
COMPARISON WITH OTHER SIMILAR WORKS
Work
Computing
Paradigm
Access Control
Trustworthy Data Processing
Operators (op.)1 Method Order-of-Magnitude
(op. exe. time)Batch Real-time Model2 Granularity Privilege3 pi σ φ γ ζ I/D crypto TEE
CryptDB [3]
√ © N/A coarse r/w √ √ √sum
√ √ √ √ © ms
Streamforce [4] © √ ACL coarse queries √ √ √sum
√ √ © √ © s
PloyStream [5] © √ ABAC fine op. set √ √ √sum √ © © √ © s
QShield
√ √
ACL coarse r/w
√ √ √ √ √ √ © √ ms
1 pi for selection or filter; σ for projection or map; φ for aggregation; γ for join; ζ for range; I/D for insert or delete;
√
sum for only summation supported.
2 N/A for not applicable; ACL for access control list; ABAC for attribute-based access control.
3 r/w denotes that a data user can perform arbitrary read and write operations on authorized data; queries demotes that a data user can only perform
specific queries on authorized data; op.set refers to that a data user can perform specific operators on authorized data.
0 50 100 150 200 250
Doc numbers
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
a
v
g
 e
x
e
 t
im
e
 (
m
s) (a). projection
0 50 100 150 200 250
Doc numbers
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
a
v
g
 e
x
e
 t
im
e
 (
m
s) (b). selection
0 50 100 150 200 250
Doc numbers
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
a
v
g
 e
x
e
 t
im
e
 (
m
s) (c). aggregation
0 50 100 150 200 250
Doc numbers
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
a
v
g
 e
x
e
 t
im
e
 (
m
s) (d). join
0 20 40 60 80 100
Data size (KBytes)
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
a
v
g
 e
x
e
 t
im
e
 (
m
s) (e). decryption (SGX)
e-scheme
baseline
Fig. 4. Performance evaluation of implemented operators and E-scheme with
Intel SGX
is efficient with millisecond (ms) order of magnitude and
has slow degradation as the size of input grows; 2) the main
computational overhead of E .decrypt(·) is caused by the time-
consuming pairing operation when reconstructing the crypto
key.
C. Comparison with Similar Systems
Table I compares QShield with other systems [3]–[5] that
support SQL-like queries and meanwhile achieve similar secu-
rity design goals, i.e., multi-user access control and trustwor-
thy data processing. The fundamental difference from QShield
is that they exploit software-based cryptography to realize
those security features. Notably, CrytoDB focuses on provid-
ing confidentiality for applications running on an untrusted
platform with archival data as input; it gives little discussion
about access control but just relies on off-the-shelf password-
based user management mechanism in DBMSes. Streamforce
and PloyStream target at a more challenging real-time stream
processing scenario and extend CrytoDB by support multi-user
access control. Unfortunately, such improvement introduces
significant performance overhead. By comparison, QShield
shows its advantage in many aspects. First, it is compatible
with both batch and real-time computing paradigms since
we opt for a flexible document-oriented data abstraction,
which can not only represent tabular data but also can denote
data streams. Second, although we only implemented four
basic operators in QShield for now, it theoretically is capable
of supporting arbitrary operators like ranging and ordering,
since SGX supports full CPU arithmetical instructions. Those
crypto-based works, however have no such extensibility due to
the limitation of cryptography. Third, QShield achieves the two
security properties without prohibitive overheads. At present,
one limitation of our work is adopting a coarse-grained ACL
model; it makes QShield unsuitable to define complex access
rules.
VII. RELATED WORK
Hardware-assisted trusted execution environment (TEE),
e.g. Intel SGX, has been utilized in many cloud-based systems.
Rearguard [11] leverages the off-the-shelf SGX to enable
secure keyword search. As a concurrent work, HardIDX [12]
also utilizes it to build secure index for searchable encryption.
Opaque [13] and Hermetic [8] both allow more generic SQL-
like queries over encrypted data with SGX. They dedicate
themselves to mitigating critical side-channel attacks, but
do not offer scalable multi-user access control, nor does it
guarantee the correctness of query results. TrustedDB [31]
allows data users to execute SQL queries with privacy and
under regulatory compliance constraints. It, however, adopts
server-hosted, tamper-proof cryptographic coprocessors (SC-
PUs), which has a much bigger trusted computing base (TCB),
instead of SGX to facilitate secure computation in critical
query processing stages. Our proposed QShield also exploits
SGX to enable secure and efficient SQL-like queries over
encrypted data. Assuming a more stronger adversary model,
i.e., an untrusted host AS may maliciously invokes enclave
interfaces, it achieves scalable access control over multiple
data users and guarantees the correctness of query results.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a secure, scalable and efficient
SQL-like query framework called QShield for outsourcing
data. It utilizes the off-the-shelf hardware-assisted trusted
execution environment (TEE), i.e., Intel SGX, to protect the
confidentiality and integrity of sensitive data being queried. In
order to make QShield capable of enforcing access control
over multiple data users in a scalable way, we presented
a novel secret sharing mechanism, with which cumbersome
authentication through remote attestation per data user is
avoided. At the same time, it greatly alleviates attack vectors
listed in our threat model. Moreover, we introduced a trust
proof mechanism in QShield to guarantee the correctness of
query results and further reduce the possibility to build knowl-
edge extractor. We implemented a prototype for QShield and
demonstrate that it is feasible in practice. With comprehensive
evaluation in terms of both performance and security, we show
that QShield achieves fundamental security properties, i.e.,
confidentiality of crypto key and outsourced data, trustworthy
query processing and scalable multi-user access control, while
raising no significant performance degradation.
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